A Universal Dilemma: The British *Sporting Life* and the Complex, Contested, and Contradictory State of Amateurism

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As a core and enduring ideal that influenced sports throughout the world for over a century, amateurism has long fascinated scholars. While historians have examined the social origins of amateurism within its institutional seedbed in Britain, the subject has proven resistant to extensive scholarly analysis. Many questions still remain unanswered: What were the mechanisms that took amateurism around the world? How was amateurism received outside of Britain? Was amateurism a monolithic, homogenous term? Or, alternatively, was it malleable, selective and fluid, transforming itself within and across national boundaries? A coordinated effort by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the popular British newspaper, *Sporting Life*, attempted to craft a universal amateur definition across all sports in the aftermath of the controversial 1908 Olympic games in London. The IOC’s difficulties in establishing an international consensus in the years prior to the Great War revealed that amateurism,

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even within the British Isles, was a vibrant, variegated ideology possessing chameleonic qualities. The sheer breadth and malleability of amateurism meant that it proved to be impossible to legislate for the status of an amateur on a global scale.

From its institutional seedbed in Britain, amateurism would become a “core and enduring ideal” that influenced sports throughout the world for over a century. Though advanced as an objective set of beliefs, values, and practices, the amateur ethos proved highly subjective. In both theory and practice amateurism varied widely across (and frequently within) sports as well as classifications such as social class, gender, nationality, and even regional identity. Along its broad social, ethical, economic, and aesthetic dimensions, amateurism was a fluid and dynamic ideology open to numerous interpretations and broad applications, particularly amongst journalists, administrators, athletes, and coaches. Amateurism was ubiquitous but elusive—broadly conceived and easily sensed but not explicitly understood and defiant of firm categorization. There was never a clear-cut and homogenous definition or universal comprehension of an amateur; it meant different things to different people in various local, regional, national, and international contexts. The sheer breadth and malleability of the ideology of amateurism meant that it proved to be impossible to legislate for the status of an amateur on a global scale.

Even within Britain, the progenitor of an amateur sports culture, the leading governing bodies of sports, produced widely conflicting definitions. During the first decade of the twentieth century, association football granted amateur status to former professionals, rowing enforced its prohibitive “mechanics” clause that barred manual laborers from competition, and yachting allowed professional crew members to compete under amateur captaincy. Some sports such as rugby union and cricket failed to define an amateur altogether. The selective, fluid, and plural dimensions of British amateur legislation can be further illuminated when examining amateur sport within the confines of the Celtic nations of Ireland, Scotland, and Wales. The London Sporting Life captured the complex, contested, and contradictory nature of British amateurism. “There are almost as many definitions of an amateur extant nowadays as games themselves. And the ramifications are equally absurd and subtle,” the popular daily newspaper opined. “The governing bodies disagree just about as much as they agree over the amateur definition itself.” Under the most severe interpretations, sports made no distinction among money as wages, prizes, gifts, legitimate expenses, and money for endorsements or advertising. Other British definitions included strict prohibitions against the participation of instructors, disobeying officials, engaging in unruly behavior, and competing with or against professionals.

Since the British failed to even come close to a uniform legislative agreement on what constituted an amateur, amateurism freely evolved into an organic and malleable construct. As it spread and diffused around the globe, amateurism modified and adapted itself to fit the needs of divergent national cultures and sporting practices. While prevailing historiography has almost exclusively viewed the transmission of amateurism as being a unidirectional process, enforced on foreign or indigenous peoples via British subjugation
and bureaucratic dominance or even being willingly embraced through cultural imitation, the diffusion of amateurism can be better understood as a broader, multidirectional, globalizing process. In the age of global communications, transoceanic travel and the establishment of worldwide agencies and sporting bureaucracies, amateurism transformed into a by-product of “cultural interchange,” a fusion of British and foreign intellectual, social and cultural beliefs, values, and practices. The high-minded, chivalrous, and moralizing tenets of the British amateur ethos met with diverging social, political, class, and sporting conditions to produce contrasting legislative amateur standards. By the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, amateurism was no longer an exclusively British construct but a multifaceted global sporting philosophy stamped with various regional and cultural nuances.

With diverging interpretations and broad applications came inevitable conflict. Ironically, in the age of increased codification and standardization in sport, in part through the establishment of national and international sports federations, amateurism proved resistant to consistency and strict universal regulation. In international sporting events like the Olympic games, participating nations boasted their own unique (and often conflicting) amateur standards. Since the establishment of the Olympic movement in 1894, Pierre de Coubertin and his colleagues on the International Olympic Committee (IOC) labored in vain trying to unify European and North American nations behind a consistent, workable definition of an amateur. As Coubertin repeatedly discovered, it proved difficult to draw a consensus on an issue that defied clear explanation and remained open to wide interpretation. Reflecting on his movement’s earlier muddles in Athens (1896), Paris (1900), and St. Louis (1904), where—in some instances—amateurs competed against known professionals and for monetary prizes, the IOC president noted vexingly: “[Amateur] rules, which seem simple enough, are more complicated in their practical application by the fact that definitions of what constitutes an amateur differ from one country to another, sometimes even from one club to another.”

Within the Olympic arena the vague and imprecise nature of amateurism fuelled bitter recriminations and international discord. At the 1908 Olympic games in London, nationalistic tensions reached a feverish pitch as Britain and America, each boasting contrasting models of “how to play the game,” clashed in a desperate and highly politicized struggle for athletic mastery. The scenes of Olympic hostilities and verbal mud-slinging amongst athletes, spectators, and officials finally convinced Coubertin to try and navigate the contested terrain of what constituted an amateur. With a view towards crafting an all-encompassing definition of an amateur to govern future Olympic contests the IOC, in close cooperation with the Sporting Life, approached national sports federations (NSFs) across the British Empire, Europe, and North America. Political and bureaucratic wrangling ensued. The IOC’s renewed difficulties in establishing a universal consensus in the years prior to the Great War revealed that amateurism was not a monolithic, hermetically sealed ideology that global sporting nations explicitly understood, legislatively applied, and rigorously enforced.

The Invention and Diffusion of Amateurism

Though often misattributed to ancient Greece, amateurism was a distinctly modern
invention born in Great Britain during the latter half of the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{11} Emerging out of a complex series of social, economic, and political changes in British society, amateurism came to influence sport—first within the Anglophone world and then beyond—for nearly a century. A holistic and loosely articulated set of ideas, beliefs, and practices, amateurism is commonly defined as being “about doing things for the love of them, doing them without reward or material gain or doing them unprofessionally.”\textsuperscript{12} The amateur played the game for the game’s sake, disavowed gambling and professionalism, and competed in a composed, dignified manner. The amateur stood modest in victory, gracious in defeat, honorable, courageous, not fanatical or too partisan, and avoided elaborate training or specialization. In practice, amateurism functioned as both a legitimating ideology for an elitist, anti-commercial sporting system as well as a broader philosophy of moral improvement and aesthetic refinement.\textsuperscript{13} Blending professional middle-class principles and voluntary structures with a romanticized aristocratic code of chivalry and honor, amateurism not only dictated \textit{who} could play but also \textit{how} they played.\textsuperscript{14}

Later popularized, internationalized, and safeguarded through the Olympic movement, amateurism was originally conceived in opposition to the commercial orientation and open professionalism that characterized nineteenth-century modern British sport. Prior to the 1860s, the amateur-professional dichotomy did not exist. Sporting culture in late Georgian and Victorian Britain was pluralistic, often transcending class and political divisions.\textsuperscript{15} Fuelled by gambling interests, open inter-class competition regularly filled the British sporting landscape. Wealthy upper-class patrons as well as publicans and clergy-men provided the financial sponsorship and moral legitimacy for dock workers, artisans, bank clerks, factory hands, and grocers to compete openly for monetary purses.\textsuperscript{16} Within this commercially-driven environment every actor—rich or poor—qualified for the role of athlete in a host of popular sports such as horse racing, rowing, pugilism, football, pedestrianism, swimming, and wrestling. Even in cricket, landed “gentlemen” and lower-class “players” competed side-by-side, albeit symbolically divided by the prevailing class prejudices of the time.\textsuperscript{17}

By the late 1800s, British sport underwent a structural transformation as commercialized, spectator sport gained in prominence. Traditional, agrarian forms of popular recreation such as animal baiting and mob football were increasingly eclipsed by large-scale, regularly organized, gate-money sport. Fuelled by the twin forces of industrialization and urbanization, sports entrepreneurs seized upon concentrated markets. Codified, bureaucratized, specialized sports emerged on a national level along the cash-nexus, aided by technological advancements in transportation.\textsuperscript{18} Grounds were fenced-off, stadia erected, and gate-money charged. In football and rugby union, cup competitions developed under the aegis of new governing bodies such as the Football Association (1863) and Rugby Football Union (1871), fuelling the prevalence of concealed professionalism in the form of payments in kind, padded expense accounts, and lucrative cash prizes. The concurrent growth of first-class county cricket and the gradual inception of a county championship expanded the commercial dimensions of British sport.\textsuperscript{19}

Once the shared—albeit unequal—preserve of all layers of male British society, modern sport slowly began to fracture under the weight of commercial expansion. The rampant commercialization of Victorian sport heightened opportunities for participation,
particularly amongst the urban masses. Through factory legislation and trade union pressure the working classes increasingly entered the sporting arena.\textsuperscript{20} The growing influx of proletarian players and teams posed a direct challenge to upper middle-class hegemony, undermining both their self-confidence and paternalistic leadership claims.\textsuperscript{21} Even off the field, the urban-industrial revolution and the mass waves of democratic reform that it inspired directly challenged the prosperity, prestige, and political significance enjoyed by the professional middle classes.\textsuperscript{22} The rising tide of liberalism, democratization, and the success of “laissez-faire” economics, prompted these new financial and industrial elites to act in a more defensive and isolationist manner. The “captains” and drivers of capitalism and industry—in union with a small fraction of the old landed aristocracy—suddenly disavowed the commercial orientation and pluralistic traditions of British sporting culture in favor of a new vision of sport. First articulated and consolidated by private clubs and British governing bodies of sport, amateurism represented a refined, moderate, and exclusive model of organized competition—an alternative to the violent, socially disruptive, and commercially driven spectator sports of the industrial masses.

The codification of socially-exclusive, anti-profit amateur legislation—often in varying terms and degrees relative to the specific sport or regional class dynamics—masks the seemingly progressive and inclusive nature of amateurism. Evolving out of the Evangelical Rational Recreation project of the mid nineteenth century, amateurism also represented a philosophy of moral improvement. The amateur ethos promulgated civilized, regulated, and vigorous competition designed to meet the shifting conditions of modern industrial and commercial British life. While competition was heralded as a moral and important force fuelling British global and economic dominance, the professional middle classes recognized that it had to regulated and contained. Ethical participation remained paramount. Axioms such as “playing a straight bat” and “it’s not cricket” comprised part of an elaborate sporting ethos that translated into broader guidelines for social intercourse. Amateurism provided a sense of civility, sociability, and cordiality in an increasingly turbulent, competitive, and industrialized world. It stressed fair play, decency, honesty, self-control, respect for opponents and officials as well as graciousness in both victory and defeat.\textsuperscript{23} It was this vision of amateurism, as a transformative moral elixir, that prompted the liberal, aristocratic Pierre de Coubertin to reunite and invigorate the French citizenry (and eventually the wider world) through sport and Olympic competition.

Evidently, amateurism was a highly complex phenomenon, a paradoxically exclusive and inclusive, reactionary, and progressive social, moral, and educational force. It also carried work, health, and aesthetic connotations. Bolstered by shifting medical opinion, amateurism called for Britons to move their bodies freely, energetically, and competitively but in accordance with a particular style and aesthetic—balanced, cultivated, and refined. Excessive physical and muscular development violated the neo-classical Hellenistic image of the well-proportioned athletic body, a British paragon of masculinity and aesthetic beauty throughout the Victorian and Edwardian ages.\textsuperscript{24} Striving, training, and specialization—hallmarks of the professional—were strongly abhorred as crude, impure, and tainted.\textsuperscript{25} From his physical appearance, clothing, posture, expressions, and even his technique and playing style, the amateur personified an aesthetic of gentlemanly British refinement.\textsuperscript{26} The sheer breadth and malleability of amateurism would serve as the secret of
its global success as well as the cause of its persistent legislative troubles and eventual decline.

As an “invented” British tradition, amateurism travelled the sporting globe, from the cosmopolitan Dominion cities of Cape Town, Sydney, and Toronto to distant British imperial outposts in sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean, Southeast Asia, and beyond. Like the spread of modern British sports and games, amateurism was diffused via a series of interrelated mechanisms: notably, the public schools, the economic and industrial system, the imperial British army, the Evangelical and Muscular Christian movements as well as a vast literary network of sporting journals, male adventure stories, and imperial tracts. In the Pax Britannica—an age of unrivalled British commercial, cultural, and naval power—sailors, merchants, school masters, and clergymen introduced British sporting pastimes to foreign lands, established the organizational and bureaucratic framework that ensured their diffusion, and inspired local traditions and patterns of play. The British reveled in their role as the leader of modern sport, espousing and legitimating their own chivalrous ideology of amateurism. Through their dominance and control of bureaucratic organizations and private clubs such as the Football Association (1863), the Marylebone Cricket Club (1787), and the Royal & Ancient Golf Club (1754), the British provided the formal codification and national—and in many cases, international—administration that elevated amateurism as a global sporting ideology.

Although far from hegemonic, amateurism left an indelible mark on all sporting cultures with which it came in contact. From Bombay and Brisbane to Buenos Aires, wherever British influence reigned, amateurism (i.e., its principles, voluntary structures, and social ethos) was appropriated, imitated, codified, and enforced—although often not in the manner, language or form, or with the same intensity that British sporting leaders imagined. Britain’s bureaucratic and cultural dominance opened the channels for its far-reaching diffusion, but amateurism’s true success lay in its ambiguity, plasticity, and breadth. Amateurism spread so pervasively—eventually taking hold within Fascist dictatorships, Communist regimes, and progressive Liberal democracies—because it was not an ironclad, highly specific, and articulate ideology. It was malleable enough to fit divergent social, political, ideological, and sporting landscapes. Its broad and elusive nature allowed the gentrified middle classes, athletic ideologues, and political opportunists alike to employ amateurism either as an emblem of social exclusivity, a tool for moral improvement and national rejuvenation, or a platform for political aggrandizement.

Amateurism’s vast geographical reach and pliability exaggerates its importance. Outside of the Olympic movement, as well as a handful of sports such as track and field, rugby union, and rowing, amateurism paled in significance and popularity to its professional counterpart—particularly beyond the British Isles. Stripped from the unique social, cultural, and ideological fabric of Victorian Britain, amateurism failed to enjoy the same degree of success and legitimacy on foreign soil. In most instances a small coterie of colonial, Anglophile elites—wielding an inordinate amount of power through the sporting bureaucracies, clubs, and colleges they governed—implemented amateur legislation in opposition to both popular sentiment and established professional sporting structures. In the individualistic, democratic, and materialistic United States, where professional baseball and a host of commercially-driven recreations dominated the sporting landscape,
British-style amateurism failed to truly capture the American imagination. Although the rhetoric and posturing of early amateur apostles such as influential sportswriter Casper Whitney, Amateur Athletic Union (AAU) chief James E. Sullivan, and Yale University’s Walter Camp ensured that amateurism appeared healthy and prosperous on the surface, in reality there was a general disconnect between the anti-profit legislation passed in committee meetings and realities on the ground. Amateurs was the overarching ideology that governed and legitimatized AAU and collegiate sports, but most U.S. athletes and officials boldly flouted the amateur code. A similar tradition of paying lip-service to the high-ideals of amateurism long characterized Scandinavian track and field and South American association football as well as French and Australasian rugby union.

The Anatomy of Olympic Amateurism

Globally recognized but not universally enforced, amateurism’s success and longevity rested in-part on the shoulders of the Olympic movement. The formation of the IOC in 1894 provided the bureaucratic framework that stimulated the diffusion of amateurism on a far-reaching scale. As an institution of remarkable homogeneity, the IOC drew its members from exclusively aristocratic and upper middle-class circles, tethered together on the basis of an elite education and a strong proclivity for amateur sport. Although enamored by the moral and aesthetic tenets of the British amateur ethos, Coubertin was not the passionate promulgator of amateurism as some myths have suggested. The long-serving IOC president was a pragmatist, a political opportunist who seized upon amateurism as a means to curry favor with influential British, European, and North American sporting elites who could heighten the success of his fledging initiative. Coubertin later conceded as much. Writing in his memoirs years later, he remarked candidly: “Today I can admit it; the [amateur] question never really bothered me. It had served as a screen to convene the Congress designed to revive the Olympic Games. Realizing the importance attached to it in sporting circles, I always showed the necessary enthusiasm, but it was enthusiasm without real conviction.”

Coubertin’s ambivalence to the strict socially-exclusive, anti-profit legislation espoused by his Anglo-Saxon contemporaries ensured that amateur debates would long trouble the Olympic movement.

Lacking a clear-cut amateur definition to govern early Olympic contests, IOC members at the International Athletic Congress held in Brussels in 1905 revived a resolution passed at the inaugural Sorbonne Congress eleven years earlier that distinguished an amateur from a professional:

An amateur is a person who has never taken part in a professional race or at a meeting open to all comers, nor has raced for any form of monetary prize for money, or for any part of money provided by the admission fees to the ground, or against professionals, and who has never at any period of his life been a professor or teacher for a salary of physical exercise.

The IOC acknowledged that these guidelines—rooted in the Anglophone tradition—were not definitive but hoped that it would assist national governing bodies of sport in determining their own future amateur standards. For the 1908 London games, the IOC, in the absence of an all-encompassing regulatory definition, approved the various interpretations of an amateur upheld by Britain’s leading governing bodies. As British Olympic
Association (BOA) Chairman Lord Desborough explained: “The definition of an amateur is a delicate and complicated matter. A universal definition of an amateur, indeed, being at the present moment impracticable, a definition applicable to each sport has been drawn up, and fully set forth in the published regulations which deal with each of the competitions.”

The IOC’s decision to grant full autonomy to the BOA created a quandary, as twenty-four British governing bodies published widely contrasting definitions of an amateur. For instance, in rowing, arguably the most socially divided of all British sports, the highly exclusive Amateur Rowing Association (ARA)—like the Amateur Motor Boat Association—enforced their prohibitive “mechanic’s clause,” which denied amateur status to any oarsman “who has ever been employed in or about boats or in manual labour for money or wages” and “who is or has been by trade or employment for wages a mechanic, artisan, or labourer, or engaged in any menial duty.” In yachting, another distinctly aristocratic pastime, the Yacht Racing Association granted permission for “professional crew members” to compete under amateur captaincy. The Amateur Fencing Association, another powerful bastion of gentlemanly amateurism, outlawed its amateurs from engaging in, assisting in, or teaching “any athletic exercise as a means of pecuniary gain.” The English Hockey Association took a more liberal stance, refusing to blacklist its instructors and coaches as professionals.

In other Olympic sports the confusion deepened. The Amateur Boxing Association granted amateur status to boxers who had fought exhibitions with “professionals,” while the English Football Association permitted re-qualified amateurs (former professionals) to compete in London. The powerful governing body of football also allowed Olympic players to receive expenses to defray the cost of housing and transportation, a policy strictly prohibited by the Amateur Athletic Association (AAA). The AAA, staunch in its opposition towards standard expenses, oddly allowed its amateurs to compete with or against “professional” rugby, football, and cricket players in competitive club or cup competitions—the English amateur fencing, golf, horse racing, swimming, and wrestling associations made a similar concession. The complexities and peculiarities of British amateur definitions ensured that for the purposes of the London games an “Olympic amateur” was not a homogenous term. As a testament to the gradual and piecemeal development of the early Olympic movement, an “amateur” in one Olympic sport could be considered a “professional” in another.

The IOC’s system of amateur regulation contributed to the growing quandary. In a move to strengthen the bond between citizenship and Olympic qualification, the IOC at its 1907 Congress at The Hague granted National Olympic Committees (NOCs)—often via their affiliate federations—sole authoritative power to verify amateur statutes. In the case of the 1908 Olympic games, the BOA requested that national federations provide guarantees that their respective athletes met the prevailing British amateur standards. For the most scrupulous and law-abiding national federations this would have proved a logistical headache, especially since their own amateur codes often did not align with the more rigorous and socially-prohibitive British definitions. The Union Belge de Sports Athlétiques, which had long provided compensation for daily travel and lodging expenses, could hardly verify that Belgian track and field athletes were amateurs in accordance with English AAA
policy. Similarly, the Fédération Française des Sociétés d’Aviron could not suddenly conform to antiquated English ideals and bar French amateur oarsmen on the grounds of low social rank. In light of such contrasting international standards, it would be naive to suggest that only “pure” amateurs in the British tradition competed at the 1908 Olympic games.

The IOC’s failure to address the problem definitively ensured that amateur debates would plague the 1908 Olympics. In the backdrop of empty seats and gray skies, the London games quickly escalated into an open athletic battle as host nation Great Britain and its trans-Atlantic cousin the United States engaged in a desperate struggle for Olympic mastery. Much of the nationalistic squabbling in London stemmed from radically different interpretations of “how to play the game.” Unlike the British who generally displayed intransigence toward modern techniques and athletic training, the Americans took a “business-like,” scientific approach to amateur sport. In the highly structured and competitive U.S. collegiate environment, “professional” coaches actively recruited talented athletes, rewarding their sporting performances by financing (to varying degrees) their studies and cost of living. Emboldened by a win-at-all-cost mentality, U.S. colleges established and promoted a comprehensive scientific basis for improving sporting performance. Albert G. Spalding’s extensive *Library of American Sports* provided coaches with up-to-date information on innovative training methods and techniques. Efficiency, specialization, organization, precision, and strategy—the American apostle of scientific management Frederick Winslow Taylor’s watchwords for producing thriving American industries—were embraced as the guiding principles of U.S. amateur sport. American coaches were world leaders, preaching the habits of drill and discipline while exploring the natural laws that governed athletic performance. To the deep and long-standing criticism of British observers, “shamateurism” prevailed on U.S. college campuses in the form of monetary prizes, neglect of academic studies, training tables, and the payment of private tutors. From a legislative perspective U.S. athletes were Olympic “amateurs,” but they did not “play the game” as the British understood it.

As the furor surrounding the 1908 Olympic games testified, amateurism was a fluid concept open to numerous interpretations and broad applications. Even to a learned observer, amateurism resisted definition; there was no single characteristic common to all cases of amateurism, no unifying thread or clear bright line that linked all definitions. For the London *Sporting Life*, this “unquestionably chaotic position” necessitated a “universal definition” to govern all future Olympic sports. “The uninitiated would doubtless presume that in the [Olympic] games an indisputable amateur definition was laid down, and no entry accepted from an athlete who did not conform to that definition. But such is not the case” the popular British sporting daily opined. Reacting to the fall-out from the London games, the *Sporting Life* invited contributors from all over the globe to offer their thoughts towards the feasibility of crafting a singular, comprehensive definition aimed at preserving the sanctity of amateur sport.

The Amateur Muddle

In the months following the 1908 Olympic games a “marathon craze” swept throughout Europe and North America. Fuelled by the highly dramatic conclusion of the mara-
thon event in London in which Italian Dorando Pietri stumbled first across the finish-line only to be later disqualified for receiving assistance by British officials, avaricious sports promoters attempted to propel pedestrianism into a commercial ambience. Lured by the offer of huge race purses, Pietri, American Johnny Hayes (the eventual Olympic gold medalist), and other leading marathoners such as Canadian Tom Longboat made the switch from the amateur to the professional ranks—marking the first attempt made by early twentieth-century Olympians to transfer their athletic fame into monetary rewards.50

The migration of some of the world’s most prominent amateur athletes to the lucrative professional pedestrian circuit symbolized the commercial impulses sweeping modern sport in the years prior to the Great War.

As professional leagues and commercial ventures flourished across Europe and North America, aided by the continued expansion of the modern mass media, the London Sporting Life took up the task of placing amateurism back upon the pedestal from which it had allegedly fallen. The Sporting Life—Britain’s oldest and most prestigious sports newspaper (after absorbing the Bell’s Life in London and Sporting Chronicle)—offered extensive coverage of amateur sporting contests throughout the British Isles. The popular British weekly had been a keen Olympic chronicler, dedicating considerable space to the 1908 Olympic games, including a flurry of negative media reports condemning the presence of foreign (notably American) “professionals” competing in London. “The existence of so many sham-amateurs among Olympic athletes” as well as the decision by marathoners Dorando, Hayes, and Longboat to “gain every possible advantage pecuniary advantage from their exalted position as champion athletes,” infuriated the Sporting Life.51 Amateurism needed to be governed and enforced against professional and commercial encroachments. The solution, the Sporting Life hypothesized, was a universal amateur standard—clearly defined, explicitly understood, and rigidly enforced by all national and international sport federations. It proposed a full-scale effort, replete with the help of the general public and sporting administrators, to collect and distil the various amateur interpretations down to one single definition.

Over the coming months the Sporting Life’s proposition generated an enormous volume of correspondence from across the globe. A highly polarizing discourse ensued. BOA chief Theodore Andrea Cook best articulated the primary strain of opposition against the ambitious project. Citing the insoluble nature of British amateurism, Cook argued that “each individual sport already finds it difficult enough to legislate for its own amateurs, and can only just face the task of legislating for amateurs who play the same sport in different countries.”52 The former Oxford rowing Blue pointed to the example of association football, a game controlled in England by two competing governing bodies boasting opposing amateur codes—a similar bureaucratic bifurcation characterized English rowing.53 The Amateur Football Association (AFA), a small group of disaffected London suburban and Old Boys’ clubs, seceded from the Football Association (FA) in 1907 in opposition to the perceived evils of professionalism afflicting the national game. Though its working definition of amateurism avoided specific reference to excluded trade and social groups, only clubs of approved class standing were welcomed within the AFA’s ranks—a far cry from its more democratic rival, the FA.54 If one sport in one country could not come to a consensus on amateurism, a pessimistic Cook reasoned, you cannot expect the
entire sporting world to unite behind “one cast iron definition which shall govern every form of sport.”

A phalanx of leading British amateur sporting personalities poured further scorn on the *Sporting Life*’s codification initiative but for an entirely different reason. The technical feasibility of a universal amateur standard paled in significance to the broader class ramifications. The adoption of a comprehensive definition of an amateur would erode (or make obsolete) the gentleman amateur distinction that had traditionally governed British sport. The old guard amateur institutions such as the AAA and the ARA would have to embrace a more inclusive and democratic ethos. Already sidelined by the advance of professionalism and retreating before the subsequent transformation of sport into a form of commercial mass entertainment, the prospect of further populist reforms sparked a chorus of patrician and upper middle-class condemnation. Walter Rye, a famous athlete from the 1860s and founder of the Thames Hare and Hounds running club, pontificated: “In my opinion there are, and always must be, two classes of amateurs, the division being a social one.” Rye pointed to “the indiscriminate mixture” in sports such as football, rugby union, golf, and tennis as proof that “men who are ‘gentlemen of position or education’ (to use the old formula) should not mix with the rougher and uneducated lot, or have them in their clubs.” Rye’s class bias found a sympathetic audience across the Atlantic in the form of American football guru Walter Camp. The prominent Yale football coach expressed an attitude befitting an Ivy League elite, when he discredited the *Sporting Life*’s scheme on the grounds that “men should compete with their own class.”

The prospective passage of a universal (and inadvertently, democratic) amateur code, coincided with broader challenges to patrician hegemony in Edwardian Britain. For landed gentlemen and the gentrified upper middle class the early decades of the twentieth century proved to be a period of remarkable change and uncertainty. The rising tide of liberal radicalism and democratization—as exemplified through the passage of the Parliament Act (1911) and the assault on the propertied order as well as the rise of the working classes—triggered a grave sense of crisis and impending disaster amongst British elites. Extensive land and social reform, collectivism, increased governmental bureaucracy, free trade, taxation on personal wealth, anti-landlordism, and the founding of the Labor Party made the ruling classes even more fearful for the future. It is in the backdrop of elevated class tensions that British opposition towards a universal amateur sporting definition should be situated. Mindful of the perilous dynamics of the British social order, Frantz Reichel, vice president and acting secretary of the Union des Sociétés Françaises de Sports Athlétiques (USFSA), mused that the “one cause of delay in arriving at a solution is the particular attitude of England.” Unlike in his native France, where the demarcation between amateurism and professionalism was drawn across pecuniary rather than occupational lines, Reichel observed that in England “there are different kinds of amateurs—notably the gentleman amateur who will not row against a man earning his living by the use of his hands.” The layered and complex social nature of British sport significantly undermined the *Sporting Life*’s codification efforts.

Amongst the barrage of negativity from across the British Isles, the *Sporting Life* maintained a positive disposition. The embattled London newspaper pointed to the establishment of the Amateur Sporting Federation of New South Wales, Australia (ASF), as a ray of
light shining through the murky, confounding waters of amateur sport. In response to the introduction of professional rugby league to eastern Australia, eleven amateur governing bodies in New South Wales, including athletics, cycling, hockey, soccer, and tennis as well as local public school and sports unions, banded together in 1908 to form a multi-sporting organization. Through bureaucratic negotiation, the ASF successfully engineered an amateur definition to govern affiliated sports in the state. Writing to the Sporting Life, the president, vice president, and secretary of the ASF heralded their success in crafting a reciprocal amateur code as proof that “what has been possible in New South Wales will be equally possible in the wider sphere of international sport.” Australian IOC member, Richard Coombes, vehemently disagreed. Citing the ASF’s failure to unite “all” governing bodies in New South Wales (cricket and baseball refused to affiliate) as well as the unlikelihood that its definition of an amateur would be recognized in other Australian states and territories the British-born editor of the Sydney Referee concluded that “efforts to bring about an international standard of amateurism . . . [are] well-nigh impossible.”

With seemingly little international support the Sporting Life went on the offensive, publishing a long, perplexing litany of amateur definitions currently in use throughout the sporting world. Its extensive collation of international codes illustrated that amateurism was a cross-cultural construct, transforming itself within and across national boundaries. The Sporting Life revealed that in France, the USFSA permitted teachers and paid instructors permission to compete in amateur competitions outside of their chosen specialty. In Australia and New Zealand, the Amateur Athletic Union of Australasia allowed its amateurs to “compete with or against professionals in any game for which no prize money is offered.” The Danks Idaets-Forbund, a broad federation of 384 Danish amateur sports clubs, approved of its amateur sailors, horse riders, and marksmen competing for monetary prizes but imposed strict ethical rules prohibiting amateurs from engaging in disorderly behavior, incurring personal debts, and boasting a “bad reputation.” North of the Scandinavian Peninsula the Swedish Football Association commissioned the payment of generous daily travel and housing allowances. Across the Atlantic, the National Collegiate Athletic Association took a far more draconian approach, outlawing every single one of these foreign practices. The sheer diversity and lack of international agreement on what constituted an amateur emboldened the London newspaper in its pursuit of crafting an Olympic amateur definition.

A Universal Dilemma

Given the broad and malleable nature of amateurism the task of establishing a universal standard for all Olympic sports appeared insurmountable. Disheartened but not defeated, the Sporting Life turned over its voluminous report to the IOC for further consideration, urging Coubertin to treat “the matter as being one of the greatest importance to the thousands of amateur athletes whose ambition it is to crown their athletic careers with Olympic laurels.” Coubertin found the Anglophone fascination with amateur legislation “childish.” He wondered, “Why disqualify an amateur athlete because he had competed with a professional, because he had taken part in events open to all comers, or because he was a sports instructor.” Ever the shrewd tactician, the IOC president veiled his personal apathy by assuring the Sporting Life’s readership that since “the present regula-
tions are unjust, and cannot be properly enforced [an] inquiry is exactly what is needed to make the position of the question understood by everyone." He forwarded the *Sporting Life*’s findings, compiled in a 150-file document, to his cousin, Baron Albert Bertier de Sauvigny, a respected French representative to the IOC.

After examining the *Sporting Life*’s comprehensive report, Baron de Sauvigny addressed the amateur issue at the 1909 IOC session in Berlin. For Sauvigny, the whole amateur question proved particularly vexing, especially given the widespread disparity that existed on the issue. With a view towards establishing definitively “What is an Amateur?” the Frenchman formulated a survey predicated on the “four main elements of the problem”: travel reimbursements, contact with professionals, instructors competing as amateurs, and the recovery of one’s amateur status. After much heated debate, the IOC approved a watered-down, five-question version of Sauvigny’s original survey:

1. Are you of the opinion that a man cannot be an amateur in one sport and a professional in another?
2. Are you of the opinion that a professor can compete as an amateur in sports other than those he teaches?
3. Are you of the opinion that when an amateur becomes a professional he cannot recover his amateur status? Do you allow any exception this rule? What are they [sic]?
4. Do you allow amateurs to receive their travelling and hotel expenses? Up to what limit?
5. Are you agreed that a man loses his title to amateur by simply competing against a professional?

The IOC commissioned the creation of a three-man committee, comprised of Britain’s Theodore Andrea Cook, American William Milligan Sloane, and Hungarian Jules de Musza, to oversee the distribution of questionnaires to national federations in the British Empire, North America, and Europe. “Delighted” by the news that the IOC had agreed to launch an international inquiry, the managing editor of the *Sporting Life* expressed his hope to Coubertin “that a definition may be framed soon.” The survey marked the IOC’s first significant attempt—since the 1894 Congress at the Sorbonne—at addressing the problem of amateur legislation.

Optimism quickly turned to disillusionment as IOC officials were forcibly reminded of the puzzling, incongruent, and volatile nature of amateurism. Circulated to NSFs across the sporting world, the IOC’s amateur survey aroused little international interest or support; only eleven federations from eight—predominantly European—nations responded to the questionnaire. Whether as a result of Theodore Andrea Cook’s previous outspoken opposition to the project, a broader national apathy towards the Olympic movement, or likely an unwillingness to align their regulatory policies with foreign nations, not one federation from Britain and its dominions answered the IOC’s amateur survey. It appeared that even the British had long accepted that amateurism was a subjective term, relative to each nation, region, and, more specifically, each sport.

Of those that did respond, a disgruntled Coubertin inveighed, “[T]he answers were widely contradictory. Neither in the same country from one sport to another, nor in countries for the same sport, did there seem to be even the slightest agreement.” On the issue of whether an athlete can be an amateur in one sport and a professional in another, only...
the Nederlandsch Gymnastick, the Federation Belge de Gymnastique, and two unnamed U.S. sport associations answered in the affirmative. Greater divisions emerged over one of the most contested issues in international amateur sport: the role of paid instructors, or as they more commonly known on the European continent, professors. As testament to the long European tradition of paid amateur ski, gymnastic, and fencing instruction, the Nederlandsch Gymnastick, the Federation Belge de Gymnastique, as well as a broad collection of Norwegian federations—excepting tennis—supported the idea that a professor can compete as an amateur in sports other than those he teaches. The Association Suisse de Football, the General Sports-Club d’Alexandrie (Egypt), and the Societa Podistica Lazio (Italy) expressed an equally supportive position.74

The requalification of former professionals aroused similar international disparity, underlining Coubertin’s protestation that the IOC’s survey generated “mere statements; no reasons. Pure fantasy; nothing concrete.”75 The Federazione Athletic Italiana, the Nederlandsch Amateur Schermbond, and the Dansk Idaets-Forbund were among those that agreed “contaminated” athletes could recover their amateur licenses following an approved waiting period—predictably, federations failed to agree on the specific time frame.76 Nations displayed a greater degree of consensus in supporting the payment of standard travel and housing expenses to amateur athletes but stood divided over the daily amount awarded and the mechanism for distributing remunerations. The Egyptian General Sports-Club d’Alexandrie proposed daily allowances of ten francs when competing in Europe, Asia, and Africa and fifteen francs for distant trans-Atlantic competitions in North America.77 The Norwegian federations advocated a more liberal amount covering travel and housing costs as well as meals and incidentals.78 The Federazione Athletic Italiana, like its compatriot the Societa Podistica Lazio, took a hard-line approach, regulating that reimbursements must only be covered when “strictly necessary” and never “paid directly to the athletes.”79

If the IOC needed any further proof that nations failed to agree on the fundamental ingredients of an amateur then the issue of “contact” between amateur and professional athletes would provide it. Contests between the two categories of athlete had long been at the heart of British sport. In English county cricket, gentlemen amateurs openly competed with and against professional players. In a host of other British sports such as track and field, golf, and swimming, amateurs were free to compete against professionals from different sport backgrounds. Amateur apologists were quick to dismiss such practices as a corrupting influence that would lead amateurs down the path towards full-blown professionalism. The Federation Suisses de Notation, the Societa Podistica Lazio, and the Norwegian federations agreed, disavowing all contact between amateurs and professionals.80

The remaining federations adopted a more pragmatic position but stood significantly apart over the exact nature of the “contact.” The Association Suisse de Football overlooked “spontaneous” meetings between amateurs and professionals but clamped down against contests “set-up in advance” and undertaken for the pleasure of a “paying audience.”81 The General Sports-Club d’Alexandrie drew a clear pecuniary distinction, disqualifying amateur athletes who competed against professionals for monetary reward.82 While the Federazione Athletic Italiana and the Dansk Idaets-Forbund allowed amateur-professional contests on the condition that athletes receive prior bureaucratic approval.83
The IOC's amateur survey offered conclusive proof that amateurism was a vibrant, variegated term possessing chameleon-like qualities. From British origins, amateurism appeared to have been lost in translation. But, what exactly were foreign nations translating? After all, British amateurism was a broad compilation of attitudes, ideas, and beliefs; it was a legitimating ideology that excluded the lower social orders from the play of the leisure class as well as a broad moral and aesthetic philosophy expressing how one should "play the game." Within sports and between sporting organizations not even the British could legislate for an amateur. The British failure to clearly define an amateur as well as account for numerous legislative technicalities and changing sporting circumstances ensured that amateurism evolved without restraint across national boundaries. Incipient sporting nations were left unsupervised and without a definitive blueprint to interpret and implement amateur rules as they saw fit and to the best of their abilities. As the IOC discovered, by the turn of the twentieth century the consequences were staggering: amateurism—never monolithic—was now undefinable, contradictory, and glaringly polarizing; its plasticity allowed nations to freely mold definitions of an amateur to fit the needs of their respective sporting and political cultures. At the 1910 IOC session in Luxembourg, British representative Theodore Andrea Cook conceded as much, revealing that "a universal definition of all sports is today impossible." He concluded that "at this time it is impossible that all associations agree to a simple formula that would define the status of amateur in a way accepted by all."84

The IOC's failure to craft a universal amateur standard for all Olympic sports stemmed in part from the Olympic movement's own legislative weaknesses. Unlike the IOC of the twenty-first century, a billion-dollar bureaucracy boasting the most popular multi-sporting event on the planet, Coubertin's fledging movement still lacked any real authority in the world of international sport. Rival Greek Olympian spectacles and the disastrous association with World Fairs in Paris and St. Louis had left the IOC in a less than salubrious position. The baron also faced successive U.S. coup attempts, dating as far back to their support for a permanent Greek Olympic games in 1896, to wrest control of the IOC from his clutches.85 As the IOC battled for legitimacy—and even for its continued existence—it had no choice but to respect the bureaucratic autonomy of more well-established, and in some cases more powerful, NSFs. Coubertin lacked the authority to demand that venerated bodies such as the English AAA, American AAU, and the French USFSA embrace a universal amateur standard for Olympic competition. Rather, the IOC needed to appease European and North American sports federations and win their favor. This was not a truly reciprocal relationship: the survival of the IOC hinged on the continued support of NSFs. Without the quadrennial appearance of British footballers, U.S. track and field athletes, and French swordsmen the Olympic games would prove short-lived, an ephemeral blur in the increasingly crowded sporting landscape. Theodore Andrea Cook acknowledged the IOC's limited bureaucratic reach. "Trying to fix [an amateur code] with too many facts and with too much rigidity in order to unify could offend federations," Cook reasoned, "so we can only offer advice and support, but we cannot impose our rules or orders."86 The IOC's fundamental dependency on national federations helps explain its long-standing failure to craft and regulate a definitive amateur policy.

The emergence and consolidation of international sport federations (ISFs) further
complicated this delicate bureaucratic power dynamic. As modern sports diffused steadily throughout the globe, stimulated by developments in transcontinental travel and communication, ISFs were established to standardize patterns of play. The French, frustrated by Britain's insular sporting attitude and bureaucratic arrogance, took the lead in the setting up of ISFs. Fourteen international bodies, including the Union Cycliste Internationale (1900) and the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (1904), were established in the years prior to the Great War. At first these organizations possessed scarce financial resources and wielded limited bureaucratic authority. Foundering on the brink of obscurity at the outset, fledging ISFs worked diligently to align national federations under one organizational umbrella. In the case of swimming, eight national federations met in Paris in the aftermath of the 1908 London games to establish the Fédération Internationale de Natation (FINA). The gradual transformation of ISFs into powerful institutions, imposing their own rules and regulations, steered them onto an inevitable collision course with the IOC.

A complex bureaucratic web had emerged in which the IOC occupied an increasingly marginalized position. Not only did Coubertin have to navigate the treacherous political terrain with NSFs but now also had to contend with their more powerful international parent bodies. Burgeoning international federations sought increased control in determining both the technical rules of the games as well as the program of Olympic events. FINA, the newly established international swimming federation, was quick to flex its bureaucratic might by threatening to boycott the 1912 Stockholm games unless the IOC recognized its own distinct rules and amateur regulations. Coubertin held the weakest hand in this relationship. Refusing to recognize the ISFs heightened authority would likely result in a widespread Olympic withdrawal and the cancellation of principal Olympic events—a devastating scenario from which his flagging games would likely not recover. This unfavorable power dynamic stifled his organizational ambition and rendered useless the IOC's attempts to establish a universal amateur standard. It would take until the 1930s and the transformation of the Olympic games into a global sporting mega-event before the IOC could regain the upper hand in this inter-organizational power struggle.

For Coubertin, the IOC's failure in unifying the growing nexus of international and national federations behind a standardized amateur definition proved the last straw. “From that moment on I lost even the little interest I had had in the question of amateurism,” he later admitted. The IOC president returned to an earlier proposal: an “oath” to be sworn by athletes as a remedy against the lies and hypocrisy of shamateurism. “An oath, not a mere public formality for show, but detailed and signed,” the Baron hypothesized, “is the only way of being sure about a man’s sporting past.” Like the ideology of amateurism itself, the oath allowed athletes to agree to an ideal without committing to specifics. It was both high-minded and practical while also being ambiguous and without real force. Even within the leadership ranks of the IOC, Coubertin's proposition was considered idealistic and impractical. The Rev. Robert Stuart de Courcy Laffan, the long-serving secretary of the BOA and one of the baron's closest confidants, strongly dismissed the idea. An “amateur oath,” Laffan discounted, “will certainly be received with disfavor and will create the impression that we are a body out of touch with the views and feelings of the athletic
Although roundly denounced and decisively dismissed, Coubertin’s advocacy of a sworn oath appeared the only solution (aside from the complete abrogation of amateurism altogether) to a vexing conundrum. Outside of a uniform standard for all Olympic sports, he believed that amateurism was simply impossible to govern. It was a zero-sum situation. Either employ an enforceable, universal amateur definition, or simply entrust the athletes to regulate themselves; anything in-between, the IOC president cautioned, would simply continue to expose the Olympic movement to inconsistency, hypocrisy, ridicule, and strife. As the IOC turned its attention towards the 1912 Olympic games in Stockholm, an event renowned for the disqualification of American double Olympic gold medalist Jim Thorpe for amateur violations, Coubertin’s insights would ring prophetic.

Conclusion

As the IOC repeatedly discovered throughout the twentieth century, amateurism was a highly complex phenomenon. The contradictory realities of amateurism undermine prevailing scholarly efforts to comprehensively theorize this phenomenon. Amateurism cannot be satisfactorily explained as an apparatus of bourgeois hegemonic persuasion, or equally, a manifestation of a wider “civilizing process” that gradually transformed Western Europe into more orderly, peaceful societies. In both ideology and application, it represented more than a mere alternative to work, a refuge from and reaction to modernity, or a counterforce to the erosion of the human “play spirit” engendered by industrialism, vulgar commercialism, and mass democracy. Contrary to popular perception, amateurism was not an iron-clad, highly specific, and articulate ideology. It was many things: broad and elusive, fluid and dynamic. It represented a pastiche of principle beliefs (i.e., repudiation of profit making, abolition of gambling, acceptance of common rules, and an emphasis on participation), enveloped by a wider set of values commonly referred to as the “spirit of sport.” Amateurism was a distinctly modern conception, grounded in material interests and social struggles and shaped by ethical, economic, and aesthetic forces.

The Sporting Life’s and the IOC’s comparative investigations illustrate that the broad and malleable nature of amateurism made clear and mutually-agreeable legislation almost impossible. Evolving without restraint, amateurism came to mean different things to different people in various local, regional, and national contexts. It was open to vast international legislative interpretation. Across national borders, definitions of an amateur were molded to fit divergent social, political, ideological, and sporting landscapes. As the IOC discovered in the years prior to the Great War, attempts to draw an international consensus were fraught with difficulties, ambiguities, and dissension. Nations and bureaucracies failed to agree on the fundamental ingredients of an amateur, rendering the IOC effectively powerless in its fight against the twin forces of commercialism and professionalism that would overwhelm the Olympic movement during the inter-war years.

KEYWORDS: AMATEURISM, OLYMPIC GAMES, PIERRE DE COUBERTIN, SPORTING LIFE

1Richard Cashman, Paradise of Sport: The Rise of Organised Sport in Australia (South Melbourne:...


The Rugby Football Union never had a “definition” of an amateur; they simply defined who was a “professional.” Still, the RFU—like the Marylebone Cricket Club—evidently had a very clear sense of who was an amateur as the “broken-time” issue and the development of Northern Rugby League demonstrates.


Vamplew, *Pay Up and Play the Game*, 33-44.


In the interest of clarity, the authors have decided to refer to these federations as being “British.” Admittedly, this is a far more nuanced situation given the fact that in some sports the home nations (England, Ireland, Scotland, and Wales) had their own independent federations, while in other sports they banded together.


Ibid., 764.

Ibid., 768.

Ibid., 767-768.

Ibid., 763.

Ibid., 763-771.

For French and Belgian amateur codes, see ibid.


Smith, *Sports and Freedom*.


1909, in SL Amateur Definition.

65“Mr. Will” [managing editor of the Sporting Life] to Pierre de Coubertin, 27 April 1909, Commission d’amateurisme: Correspondence (1894-1968), ID Chemise: 204767, IOC Archives.


70“Mr. Will” [managing editor of the Sporting Life] to Pierre de Coubertin, 12 July 1909, Commission d’amateurisme: Correspondence (1894-1968), ID Chemise: 204767, IOC Archives.

71For a full detailed report of the IOC’s findings see International Olympic Committee, Annual Meeting Minutes, 11-13 June 1910, Luxembourg, pp. 32-38, IOC Archives. See Captain [Johann Tidemann] Sverre to Pierre de Coubertin, 26 April 1910; Federazione Athletic Italiana to M. Jules de Muza, 17 December 1909; General Sports-Club d’Alexandrie to M. Jules de Muza, 10 January 1910; Federation Belge de Gymnastique et M. Jules de Muza, 4 January 1910; Nederlandsch Amateur Schermbond to M. Jules de Muza, 2 January 1910; Nederlandsch gymnastiek to M. Jules de Muza, 3 March 1910; Association Suisse de Football to M. Jules de Muza, 19 February 1910; Dansk Idraets-Forbund to Theodore Andrea Cook, 19 February 1910; Federation suisses de notation to M. Jules de Muza, 10 November 1909, all found in Commission d’amateurisme: Questionnaires sur l’amateurism (1909-1926), ID Chemise: 204769, IOC Archives.


73Coubertin, Olympic Memoirs, 120.

74International Olympic Committee, Annual Meeting Minutes, 11-13 June 1910, Luxembourg, 32-38, IOC Archives.

75Coubertin, Olympic Memoirs, 120.

76International Olympic Committee, Annual Meeting Minutes, 11-13 June 1910, Luxembourg, 32-38, IOC Archives.


80International Olympic Committee, Annual Meeting Minutes, 11-13 June 1910, Luxembourg, 32-38, IOC Archives.


83International Olympic Committee, Annual Meeting Minutes, 11-13 June 1910, Luxembourg, 32-38, IOC Archives.

84Ibid., 32-33.
85 Dyreson, *Making the American Team*, 128-129.
86 International Olympic Committee, Annual Meeting Minutes, 11-13 June 1910, Luxembourg, 33, IOC Archives.
89 Ibid.; “Mr. Will” [managing editor of the *Sporting Life*] to Pierre de Coubertin, 3 August 1909, Commission d’amateurisme: Correspondence (1894-1968), ID Chemise: 204767, IOC Archives.
92 Rev. Robert S. de Courcy Laffan to Pierre de Coubertin, 23 December 1912, Grande-Bretagne Correspondence (1892-1923), OU MO 01 14 36, IOC Archives.